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A model for availability growth is developed to capture the effect of systemic risk prior to construction of
a complex system. The model has been motivated by new generation offshore wind farms where
investment decisions need to be taken before test and operational data are available. We develop a
generic model to capture the systemic risks arising from innovation in evolutionary system designs. By
modelling the impact of major and minor interventions to mitigate weaknesses and to improve the
failure and restoration processes of subassemblies, we are able to measure the growth in availability
performance of the system. We describe the choices made in modelling our particular industrial setting
using an example for a typical UK Round III offshore wind farm. We obtain point estimates of the
expected availability having populated the simulated model using appropriate judgemental and
empirical data. We show the relative impact of modelling systemic risk on system availability perfor-
mance in comparison with estimates obtained from typical system availability modelling assumptions
used in offshore wind applications. While modelling growth in availability is necessary for meaningful
decision support in developing complex systems such as offshore wind farms, we also discuss the relative
value of explicitly articulating epistemic uncertainties.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Our model is motivated by the need to support risk manage-
ment decisions in offshore wind, where there is considerable
innovation as the industry expands [20]. Empirical evidence
indicates that availability performance of new farms has been
below expectations during early operational life, with operating
targets only being achieved after growing availability through the
implementation of effective ﬁxes over, typically, the ﬁrst four years
of operation [2]. However, responsive remedial action to improve
availability not only impacts on income generation, but it also
implies that extra capital expenditure is being incurred during
periods when only operational expenditure had been planned.
This contributes to the problem of lack of equity in the UK offshore
wind energy market [40,11] since projects are in competition for
capital with other investment opportunities, and hence have to be
competitive in terms of risk and return.
In a bid to increase capacity and reduce Operation & Main-
tenance (O&M) costs, the Cost Reduction Task Force [20] recom-
mends the use of innovative designs of high-yield, high-reliabilityr Ltd. This is an open access article
itrou),
rath.ac.uk (L. Walls).turbines. However, new generation turbines are technically imma-
ture systems that are to operate further from the UK shore and in
deeper waters than earlier versions. Hence, these new systems are
subject to high physical stresses and are potentially vulnerable to
systemic weaknesses in design, operation, installation and manu-
facturing. Therefore, paradoxically, the bid to decrease cost and
accelerate offshore wind deployment actually increases some
investor risks. Of course, as manufacturers and operators gain better
understanding of operation and the environment, technical issues
can be resolved through a series of interventions such as design
upgrades, modiﬁed operational processes or changes in main-
tenance activities. However, commercial organisations, private
investors and governments are required to make investment deci-
sions prior to construction, before operating experience is accu-
mulated. Our model is designed to be used in this setting. By
modelling the availability growth process, we are positioned to
inform the modelling of future income streams and capital and
maintenance costs.
The value of growing reliability during system design and
development is widely acknowledged [51]. Nevertheless, there has
been no reported use of reliability growth analysis in an offshore
context. Instead, modelling effort has focussed upon estimating
availability performance under operational and maintenance
strategies assuming that the wind farm is operating in steady-state
[43,39,4,3,41,12,25,16]. Only [3] and [16] consider departures fromunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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life. It is not possible to investigate growth using the existing
availability models through sensitivity analysis since the models'
structures do not allow for this. Hence, the existing models used in
offshore wind do not address the issue of growing performance,
which is an important modelling challenge if effective and efﬁcient
risk management decisions are to be made.
Here we develop a model for availability growth to address the
particular challenges that the offshore wind sector faces. Though
our model has a general formulation meaning and it should have
applicability to other systems for which availability, rather than
just reliability, is a key performance measure. We formulate a
model to represent systematic failures triggered by weaknesses in,
for example, design, manufacture and/or installation. The model,
when appropriately combined with stochastic processes repre-
senting random failure and restoration events, provides a measure
of availability. We assume that major interventions to address
systemic weaknesses are made at discrete time points associated
with what we term an innovation. By the term innovation we
include, for example, re-design of system parts, major changes to
installation processes, new vessel options for routine maintenance.
In an offshore wind context, such innovations are likely to be
scheduled to allow for the logistic delays in accessing the farm.
Between innovations we allow for learning effects, since it is not
unreasonable to expect maintainers and operators to continuously
adapt their procedures and processes to improve the execution of
routine tasks. The creation of an availability growth model allows
us to explore the impact of different scenarios arising from
systemic weaknesses in equipment, and to examine the cost-
effectiveness of mitigation strategies.
In offshore wind, as for many other system development pro-
cesses, the design is evolutionary implying that the current gen-
eration is related to the previous one [37,53]. For example, tech-
nology is largely based on modiﬁed onshore and early offshore
wind turbines. In some areas, such as cable installation, there has
been signiﬁcant learning through method adaptation [1]. Offshore
wind foundations are designed on the basis of principles applied
in oil and gas, and installation of these structures is performed
using mainly oil and gas vessels and procedures [47]. Nevertheless,
innovation is necessary for new generation farms – such as the UK
Round III sites – to deal with increased water depth and distance
from shore [1]. Innovation is the driver of change between gen-
erations of product or process design, but is also of itself a major
risk to future performance.
Typically a new system evolutionary design needs to meet an
availability performance target at least equal to that achieved by
the previous generation. On the basis of operational experience
from earlier generation systems and analogous systems, it is pos-
sible for suitably qualiﬁed experts to make assessments of
potential failure modes, make useful assessments of their impact
(e.g. in terms of shortening lifetimes), and advise on potential
mitigation strategies. By using the existing methodologies for
expert judgement processes for this type of problem [49,23,7], we
have structured our model through discussion with domain
experts and practitioners.
In developing our model we draw upon the existing body of
knowledge for reliability growth modelling and the limited con-
sideration of availability growth. For example [9,10,26,42,17] are
amongst many authors who propose models for reliability growth
that is typically positioned during product development, where
the goal is to improve reliability by identifying and removing
weaknesses. The effect of modiﬁcations in such models is repre-
sented as a learning curve [15,10] but models also exist that allow
for the representation of a series of discrete modiﬁcations through,
for example, structural changes in the failure intensity [44,17].
Beyond the classical reliability growth methods for both hardwareand software systems in development, there are also models
proposed for supporting reliability growth during design [51] and
through life [50]. These models tend to be framed from the per-
spective of the owner of the design blueprint.
To model availability – rather than reliability – growth, the
premise of modelling needs to be extended to represent inter-
ventions that intend not only to remove the sources of potential
failures, but also to reduce the restoration time. There is limited
mention of such models in the literature. For example, the models
found in [48,29] assess availability growth for software rather than
hardware, but this is achieved exclusively through a fault removal
process – implying that there are no interventions associated with
the restoration process. Hence, these papers essentially apply
reliability growth models to situations where restoration durations
are assumed constant.
Our context requires us to draw on existing thinking about
reliability growth to develop a model for availability growth that
can be used not only by those with design responsibility, but also
by those involved in ﬁnancing and operating the system. We seek
to model availability during early operational life of a system
because this is the period during which many teething problems
are surfaced in use and because of the limited nature of Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) warranties, unavailability in early
life has an impact on both OEM and system operator. Our mod-
elling approach is distinctive because we provide a single frame-
work which integrates the effect of interventions intended to
improve reliability with the effect of interventions intended to
reduce restoration times, in order to estimate availability during
speciﬁed time horizons. We explicitly include in the model the
effect of condition monitoring, as this would allow us to predict
the likely impact of investing in this type of maintenance strategy
on system availability. The model output is an indicator of
availability-informed capability that captures the effect of partially
operating turbines on farm energy generation. Reduced output
might occur, for example, when operators de-rate degraded
turbines to accommodate logistic delays in gaining access for
maintenance.
In this paper we describe the formulation of the growth model
and illustrate its application to an offshore wind farm example. We
believe this paper makes both a methodological and a contextual
contribution. Methodologically we introduce a new model for
system availability growth that extends current knowledge of
reliability growth modelling. Contextually we show the effects of
systemic risk on offshore wind farm availability, thereby addres-
sing a shortcoming of the existing availability models proposed for
operational and maintenance decision support in this industry. As
presented in this paper, our model only considers aleatory
uncertainty; that is, natural variability between different systems,
for example the stochastic time to failure of each wind turbine.
When considering the behaviour of future systems, which is when
this model will be particularly useful for decision support, there
are clearly also state-of-knowledge (i.e. epistemic) uncertainties.
For example, in the application example given here, the design
modiﬁcations are modelled as perfectly removing anticipated
weaknesses. But assuming perfect ﬁxes can be naive and by
extending the model to include representation of state-of-
knowledge uncertainties, we can better model the efﬁcacy of
innovations on performance. The modelling required to represent
state-of-knowledge uncertainty in this setting is quite substantial
and goes beyond the objectives of the present paper. In [54] we
explain how the availability growth model can include repre-
sentation of state-of-knowledge uncertainty, as well as aleatory
uncertainty, and examine the implications of uncertainty assess-
ment for more effective systemic risk reduction to better support
dialogue between the ﬁnancial and engineering stakeholders in
the offshore wind sector.
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general rationale for availability growth modelling, while Section 3
presents the mathematical foundations of our model. Section 4
provides an example that explains how we might scope, populate
and use the model for a real context based on a typical UK Round
III wind farm and examines the impact of appropriately modelling
growth. Section 5 concludes by reviewing the limitations as well
as beneﬁts of our approach and identiﬁes areas of further work,
including a discussion of the relative value of modelling state-of-
knowledge uncertainties.2. Modelling rationale
Technical availability is the key modelling criterion of the sys-
tem (i.e. the offshore wind farm). The system is assumed to be
operating fully or partially (i.e. uptime performance) or not (i.e.
downtime performance). System performance depends on the
performance of constituent subassemblies. Uptime performance
reaches target levels when the actual reliability of subassemblies is
as planned. Likewise, target downtime performance is achieved
when there are no prolonged downtimes of subassemblies due to,
for example, logistics or weather-induced delays.
Fig. 1 presents a visual representation of our modelling ratio-
nale showing the factors that may increase the chance of below-
target uptime and/or downtime performance and subsequently
impact on system availability. The factors have been identiﬁed
through conversations with relevant engineers and categorised
according to their effect on failure or restoration processes.
2.1. Factors inﬂuencing uptime
Inadequacies in the design, manufacturing defects or opera-
tional errors are factors that can lead to premature wear-out,
increased vulnerability to external shocks, or both. Collectively we
call these factors Triggers since they are sources of systemic risk
that can reduce subassembly reliability. We deﬁne three classes of
trigger as follows.Innovation
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework for availability growth model. Oval nodesDesign inadequacies are issues with system design caused either
by an inappropriate blueprint for the speciﬁed operating condi-
tions, or by design environmental parameters that poorly reﬂect
actual operating conditions. Consider offshore wind transformers
which can be placed in the bedplate exposing them to vibration.
Levels of vibration are not fully understood because new genera-
tion turbines are larger and operate further from shore. This
introduces risk of design inadequacy. We anticipate that upscaling
offshore wind subassemblies can introduce more general issues
with the design. For example, it has been observed that larger
gearboxes tend to be less reliable than smaller ones [46].
Manufacturing faults occur when a shortcoming in the pro-
duction process control and quality management of the manu-
facturer allows for defects to remain and be realised in operation.
For example, offshore wind turbine blades are prone to manu-
facturer faults as they require a particularly labour-intensive
manufacturing process, increasing the potential for human error
during manufacturing.
Operational errors relate to human error during repair or
installation. For offshore wind farms in particular, installation error
can be an important driver of early life reliability. Activities such as
the connection of transmission cables, for example, are prone to
this type of issue: a combination of tight deadlines, schedule
pressures and task complexity introduce the potential for faults
and errors during installation that can lead to decreased cable
reliability.
2.2. Factors inﬂuencing downtime
In general, restoration depends on factors such as difﬁculties in
acquiring resources and gaining access to site. For example, harsh
wind and wave conditions can render an offshore wind farm site
inaccessible for extended periods of time delaying maintenance
activities and extending restoration times. Offshore wind sites can
also experience considerable logistic delays. Operations like gear-
box replacement require expensive specialised jack-up vessels
which are typically hired. So, repair is associated with proceduresowntime Performance
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can result in additional delay.
We model such weather-induced delay as a random variable,
which we call waiting time. Waiting time represents the period
between when maintenance crew and resources are ready and
when the trip to the site commences. The uncertainty on waiting
time is determined conditionally on the failed subassembly, since
the type of failure determines the period over which weather
conditions need to be favourable, and on the time of the year,
because waiting times are longer in the winter months – at least in
the UK. We estimate the waiting time distributions using historical
wind and wave data using an algorithm developed in [13].Fig. 2. Lifetime stages of a subassembly until time to ﬁrst failure T. Tj is the elapsed
time from Sj1, the time the subassembly leaves Stage j1, until its ﬁrst failure
from a mechanism relevant to Stage j (j¼1,2). Stage 1 is a shock-dominating period.
Stage 2 is a period of both shocks and wear-out mechanisms. W1 is the time that
elapses from start of operation until the subassembly starts to wear (leaves
Stage 1).2.3. Interventions
The model aims to capture the integrated effect of all factors
affecting subassemblies on system availability, and to predict the
evolution of availability as technical, operational, and organisa-
tional interventions are implemented. We classify Interventions in
terms of their effect on availability. As in Ansell et al. [5], we
separate interventions into innovations, which have a major effect
on performance, and minor adjustments, which result in less
radical improvement.
We deﬁne Innovations to be radical actions that change the
basic underlying properties of the system. For example, redesigns
to address design issues typify an innovation that affects sub-
assembly reliability. We allow for the chance of achieving target
reliability to differ between a new generation design and an
upgrade. Innovations also relate to asset-management decisions
where, for example, employing different operational strategies,
such as ﬁx on failure or charter contracts, might result in different
logistic delays. Equally purchasing a new vessel might affect
weather waiting times.
We deﬁneMinor Adaptations to be interventions that impact on
the system in a more gradual manner relative to the effect of
innovations. Typically, Minor Adaptations are related to learning
and the accumulation of experience with the system and its
operation. For example, as time progresses, maintenance crews
can become more effective conducting low-level maintenance
activities such as inspections and calibrations, and so may be less
likely to make an error during large-scale maintenance operations
such as replacements.
We also identify a third class of intervention that requires
separate consideration in our model. We name this third class
Maintenance Strategy. It represents the inﬂuence of maintenance
on the condition of subassemblies and, thus, on the pattern of
failures. Maintenance Strategy encompasses both the type of
intervention (i.e. preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance
or condition monitoring) and the effect of intervention on the
system condition (i.e. perfect or imperfect repair). For example,
maintenance actions such as carbon brush replacement have a
minor effect on turbine condition and are modelled as imperfect
repair, implying the subassembly state after maintenance is either
as it was just before failure, or somewhere in between this and as
good as new. Major maintenance activities, such as hub replace-
ments, restore the subassembly to its original condition, and are
modelled as perfect repairs. Our model allows for the modelling of
different levels of imperfect maintenance; however, we note that it
is not primarily designed to optimise maintenance logistics, as this
would go beyond the level of discrimination of the model.3. Availability growth model mathematical formulation
3.1. A parametric model for the hazard rate of a subassembly
To represent subassembly failure behaviour we classify under-
lying failure mechanisms broadly into shocks and wear-out.
Shocks are external single stress events whereas wear-out relates
to accumulated damage. We assume that subassemblies go initi-
ally through a wear-out free period where shocks dominate, which
ends when wear-out begins. It is not expected for subassemblies to
age prematurely, and target reliability proﬁles assume that wear-
out occurs after early life.
We refer to the initial shock-dominating period as Stage 1, and
to the succeeding wear-out and shock period as Stage 2. Let Sj be
the time the subassembly leaves Stage j, for now considered ﬁxed.
The lifetime of the system is broken down into distinct intervals
½S0; S1Þ and ½S1; S2Þwhere S0 ¼ 0; S2 ¼1. Let U(t) denote the system
stage at time t viz.:
UðtÞ ¼ j3Sj1rtoSj; for j¼ 1;2 ð1Þ
First, we deﬁne the failure behaviour of the subassembly dis-
tinctly over the different lifetime stages. For j¼1,2, let Tj be the
elapsed time from Sj1, the time the subassembly leaves Stage
j1, until its ﬁrst failure from a mechanism relevant to Stage j. We
assume Tj is a continuous random variable with cumulative dis-
tribution function Fj. Given that UðtÞ ¼ j, the system has (condi-
tional) hazard rate function, or Force of Mortality (FOM), given by
mjðtjÞ ¼
PðtjrTjotjþΔtjÞ
PðTj4tjÞ
¼ f jðtjÞ
1FjðtjÞ
; where tj ¼ tSj1: ð2Þ
Furthermore, let random variable W1 with distribution function G1
represent the time when wear-out starts having an effect. A sub-
assembly enters Stage 2 only if the onset of wear-out precedes a
shock failure. Fig. 2 presents a visual representation of this
reasoning.
Let random variable T with distribution function F represent
the lifetime of the system, measured from the start of operation
until the ﬁrst failure. Assuming shocks and the onset of wear-out
act as independent competing risks, we can write
T ¼minfT1;W1gþT2IðT14W1Þ ð3Þ
where IA is the indicator variable of the event A. Now, the
(unconditional) hazard rate of the subassembly given by
hðtÞ ¼ PðtrTotþΔtÞ
PðT4tÞ ¼
f ðtÞ
1FðtÞ: ð4Þ
can be deﬁned conditionally as
hðtÞ ¼ hðt jH t  Þ ¼mjðtSj1Þ ð5Þ
where H t  is the relevant system data observed until just before
time t, such as the lifetime stage, as well as wider operation and
Fig. 4. Degradation process and indicator process curves: the two processes are
correlated; the indicator process reaches the critical threshold before the degra-
dation process, giving a signal prior to actual failure.
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detail.
Shock failures, which dominate Stage 1 of the subassembly
lifetime, occur at random and are represented by a constant
hazard rate. Using an exponential distribution for F1 implies that
m1ðt1Þ ¼ ρ is constant. Wear-out mechanisms appear when the
subassembly enters Stage 2, in addition to shock failures, implying
that m2ðt2Þ ¼ ρþhðt2Þ where hðt2Þ is the wear-out hazard and can
be represented by a monotonically increasing function – with
time, or any other proxy of damage accumulation.
The choice of an increasing hazard rate function to represent
wear-out depends on the level of knowledge of the underlying
degradation mechanisms and the available data. Our model
structure allows degradation to be modelled explicitly or impli-
citly, depending on the application. When degradation data are
available allowing internal failure mechanisms to be traced, then a
degradation model can be used. See, for example [32]. If sufﬁcient
degradation data to allow model speciﬁcation are not available, we
represent wear-out failure using parametric models for the life-
time distribution. For illustration in this paper we assume a
Weibull model to represent wear-out failures, implying that
m2ðt2Þ ¼ ρþηβðt2s1Þβ1.
Our parametric model bears similarities with other approaches.
For example, we break down the time to signal into smaller seg-
ments (i.e. shock and wear-out dominated periods) to model
system lifetime in more detail than the Delay Time model [8,52]
and we relax the assumption made by [6] that the times at which
the system enters a lifetime stage are always observable by the
operator.
Fig. 3 illustrates the hazard rate for a subassembly entering
Stage 2 at time S1 ¼ s1. A subassembly achieving at least target
reliability will have relatively lower rate of shock failures ρ, an
onset of wear-out s1 outside the early life window, and relatively
slower rate of increase in the wear-out hazard rate, as shown in
Fig. 3(a). If the subassembly performs below target then it is
subject to more frequent random failures (ρ04ρ) throughout the
whole early life and premature, more severe wear-out (s01os1);
see Fig. 3(b).
3.2. Condition monitoring of subassemblies subject to wear-out
Condition Monitoring (CM) can indicate incipient failure by
tracking measurable wear-out indicators associated with the
underling degradation process and releasing a signal prior to
failure; see Fig. 4. For example, wear-out of offshore wind turbine
gears and bearings can increase the generation rate of particles
above a certain size in gearbox oil [24]. Upon the observation of
the CM signal, operators can respond by, for example, de-rating aFig. 3. Subassembly hazard rate: a subassembly with below-target reliability (b) has modamaged turbine, to extend its residual life and allow time to plan
maintenance actions. We include CM explicitly within the avail-
ability growth model because it allows us to predict the likely
impact of investing in CM on farm availability.
To capture the effect of CM on a subassembly's failure beha-
viour, we extend the hazard model presented in Section 3.1 to
include the wear-out indicator. We assume the CM indicator starts
evolving when the subassembly enters Stage 2 at time S1 (i.e. it
begins to wear). Given that the signal threshold is passed after
time W2, counted from S1, then time S2 ¼ S1þW2 is when the
subassembly enters Stage 3. T3 denotes the subassembly's lifetime
given that a CM signal is observed. Therefore, the CM signal fur-
ther partitions the subassembly lifetime, as shown in Fig. 5, into
0 S0oS1oS2oS3 1: ð6Þ
Since the degradation and indicator processes are associated,
the time to the CM signal, W2, and the conditional lifetime of the
subassembly in Stage 2, T2, should both depend on the same
underlying degradation process. Let W2 have distribution G2. We
can write F2ðt2Þ ¼ F2ðt2 jθÞ and G2ðw2Þ ¼ G2ðw2 jθÞ where θ is the
vector of the degradation model parameters. Given θ, T2 and W2
are conditionally independent random variables, then within an
independent competing risks framework, the subassembly life-
time in (3) can be written as
T ¼minfT1;W1gþminfT2;W2gIðT14W1Þ þT3IðT24W2Þ ð7Þ
where IA is the indicator variable of event A. Note that if upon
observation of the CM signal at time S2, an operator chooses not to
act (e.g. to de-rate the turbine comprising the degrading sub-
assembly) then random variable T3 has the same distribution as T2.
To apply the availability model, the anticipated effectiveness of
CM (i.e. the more correlated F2ðÞ and G2ðÞ, the more effective the
CM) and the operating practice in response to the CM signalre frequent shock failures than in (a) and premature and/or more severe wear-out.
Fig. 5. Lifetime stages of a subassembly subject to condition monitoring until time
to ﬁrst failure T. Tj is the elapsed time from Sj1, the time the subassembly leaves
Stage j1, until its ﬁrst failure from a mechanism relevant to Stage j (j¼1,2).
Stage 1 is a shock-dominating period. Stage 2 is the period when both wear-out and
shocks mechanisms are present, but before the release of a CM signal. Stage 3 is the
period when both wear-out and shocks mechanisms are present, after the obser-
vation of a CM signal. W1 is the time that elapses from start of operation until the
subassembly starts to wear; W2 is the time that elapses from the onset of wear-out
until the CM signal is observed.
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a signal far in advance of failure, upon which operating perfor-
mance is reduced to partial operation through some planned
intervention.
3.3. Intensity of events
The hazard rate given in (2) describes the subassembly lifetime
in terms of its time to ﬁrst failure. Since offshore wind sub-
assemblies are repairable systems, we use a marked point process
fTn; JngnZ1 to describe their alternating behaviour between failure
and repair, where Jn ¼ 1 when a failure occurs at Tn and Jn ¼ 0
otherwise (n¼ 0;1;2;…). Let N(t) and M(t) be the number of
failures and restorations in ð0; t respectively, where t is calendar
time. The conditional intensity of the marked point process is
deﬁned as
ιðt jH t Þ ¼
λðt jH t Þ : subassembly operates just before time t
μðt jH t Þ : subassembly does not operate just before time t ¼ 0
(
where
λðt jH t Þ ¼ lim
Δt-0
Prðfailure in ½t; tþΔtÞjH t Þ
Δt ð8Þ
and
μðt jH t Þ ¼ lim
Δt-0
Prðrestoration in ½t; tþΔtÞjH t Þ
Δt : ð9Þ
H t is the history of the subassembly until, but not including, time
t. History represents the information about a subassembly's past
life that needs to be captured to support model computations. For
simplicity, from this point forward we use ιðtÞ; λðtÞ and μðtÞ instead
of ιðt jH t Þ;λðt jH t Þ and μðt jH t Þ respectively.
The intensity λðtÞ, or the Rate of Occurrence of Failures
(ROCOF), is the outcome of the interaction of the inherent relia-
bility characteristics of the subassembly, described by the hazard h
(t), with the maintenance type (i.e. corrective or preventive) and
effect (i.e. perfect or imperfect repair). The hazard deﬁnes the
baseline condition of the subassembly, while the maintenance
type and effect determine how this is controlled during operation.
In our model, the effect of maintenance is captured via the concept
of virtual age v(t) [27]. We have
λðtÞ ¼ hðvðtÞÞ; t40 ð10Þ
where v(t) is equal to the cumulative uptime denoted with x(t),
where
xðtÞ ¼
XNðtÞþMðtÞ
k;Jk ¼ 1ðJk ¼ 0Þ
TkTk1: ð11Þ
For a new system vðtÞ ¼ 0. Therefore, perfect maintenance essen-
tially resets the virtual age of the turbine to zero, whereas minimalrepair sets its value to the one it had just before failure. Several
models have been developed for cases where repair effect lies
between perfect and imperfect, e.g. [14], and might provide
alternative formulations for the availability model.
Whereas virtual age v(t) describes the effect of maintenance
actions and repair, the effect of routine maintenance, such as oil
changes, cleaning and lubrication, is captured implicitly by
assuming that the pattern implied by the intensity in (10) assumes
that such actions are undertaken properly. It is interesting to note
that under the assumption of minimal repair, the hazard rate hðÞ
and the failure intensity λðÞ have the same mathematical for-
mulation, even though they represent different quantities. It also
emerges that the history H t in (10) not only includes a sub-
assembly's lifetime stage, but also its virtual age, as deﬁned on the
basis of information on the time and type of the last maintenance.
The repair intensity μðtÞ can be expressed by a relationship
similar to (10) where hðÞ relates to the maintenance time dis-
tribution and v(t) accounts for the amount of continuous time the
system is under repair (i.e. cumulative downtime) as measured
from the last failure event and excluding any logistic or weather
delays.
3.4. Effect of interventions
3.4.1. Innovations
Since innovations are planned large-scale operations intended
to have a radical effect on system performance, we model them
discretely at times S1; S2;…; Sm, which are assumed to be known a
priori. Within the UK offshore wind energy context this is a rea-
sonable assumption, since interventions such as design upscaling
and subassembly re-ﬁtting typically take place during the summer
months, to take advantage of the relatively less severe weather
conditions on site. Therefore, innovations partition the early life
ð0; T  of the system as
0¼ oR1oR2o⋯oRm ¼ T :
Let ιiðtÞ and hiðtÞ; t4Ri, denote the conditional intensity and
hazard function respectively of a system after the i-th innovation
(i¼ 0;1;…). Similarly to (10), the failure intensity and hazard
function are associated through equation
λiðtÞ ¼ hiðvðtÞÞ; t40: ð12Þ
We assume the (iþ 1)-th innovation has an effect on the basic
behaviour of the subassembly, as expressed via hiðÞ. Innovations
intend to bring the below-target reliability back to the target
level and shift the subassembly proﬁle from the one portrayed in
Fig. 3(b) to the one in Fig. 3(a). This is achieved by making mod-
elling choices to either reduce the shock failure rate (ρioρiþ1), or
delay wear-out (Si1oSiþ11 ), or decrease the wear-out rate. For the
latter case, the wear-out rate can be modiﬁed by modulating the
scale parameter of the lifetime distribution. For example, [38]
makes a similar assumption when capturing enhancements in a
software reliability context. Ref. [17] assumes that innovations
impact the scale parameter of the Non Homogeneous Poisson
Process model, whereas the shape parameter after intervention
remains the same. In the context of accelerated life testing, [32,35]
allow a change in stress level to impact the location of the log-
lifetime (i.e. the scale parameter of the lifetime distribution),
rather than the failure mechanism as expressed via the shape
parameter of the lifetime distribution. However, these assertions
are typically formed on the basis of statistical analysis, and the
assumption that increased stress impacts only on one parameter is
not always appropriate – see [31,33] and references therein.
To impose the orderings implied by the effect of innovations on
shocks and wear-out, we intentionally use a simple version of the
Fig. 7. Effect of learning on failure intensity when minor adaptations occur con-
tinuously. In this example: system lifetime is represented by a Weibull distribution
with shape parameter β¼ 1:5 and scale parameter η¼ 0:5, and the system is subject
to corrective maintenance only with minimal repair and negligible restoration times.
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ρiþ1 ¼ϕiρi; Siþ11 ¼ ð1þϕiÞSi1 and ηiþ1 ¼ϕiηi ð13Þ
where ηi is the scale parameter of the lifetime distribution of a
system subjected to i innovations and 0oϕir1 is a ﬁx-
effectiveness parameter. One can produce a more elaborate model
by deﬁning as many ﬁx-effectiveness parameters as the number of
parameters affected by the innovation, or simplify the model further
by assuming that ϕi ¼ϕ for every i. Regardless of the choice,
determining the intensity in (10) requires information on the
number of innovations undertaken to be included in history H t .
As an example, consider a subassembly subject only to wear-
out with hazard rate
h0ðvðtÞÞ ¼ ηβðvðtÞÞβ1; ð14Þ
and, suppose that the subassembly is subject only to corrective
maintenance with minimal repair and negligible restoration times.
These assumptions imply that vðtÞ ¼ t and that
λðtÞ ¼ hiðtÞ ¼ϕi1ηβtβ1 for some 1r irm: ð15Þ
Fig. 6 shows these assumptions result in a stepwise change in the
subassembly intensity.
3.4.2. Minor adaptations
Recall that the hazard in (10) expresses the failure behaviour of a
subassembly subject to routine maintenance. As experience accu-
mulates and operators learn, maintenance practices are adjusted
and procedures are improved. These changes, referred to as minor
adaptations, can have an almost continuous positive effect on sys-
tem performance as expressed by the failure or restoration inten-
sities. We model this effect in terms of function φðÞ.
The failure intensity of a subassembly after the i-th innovation
and subject to minor adaptations is now given by
λðtÞ ¼ hiðvðtÞÞφðtÞ: ð16Þ
A number of formulations for φðtÞ can be used to represent this
‘learning effect’ due to minor adaptations. Here, we choose a
function that is bounded and non-increasing function of t to
represent the decreasing chance of failure resulting from learning,Fig. 6. Innovations (ϕ¼ 0:9) occur every two time periods. The lifetime of the
system is represented by a Weibull distribution with shape parameter β¼ 1:5 and
scale parameter η¼ 0:5. The system is subject to corrective maintenance with
minimal repair and restoration times are assumed negligible.and we have
φðtÞ ¼ 1 t
tþγ: ð17Þ
Since learning is the result of accumulated operating experi-
ence, it is reasonable to assume that minor adaptations depend on
calendar time t, and the history H t should include this informa-
tion to allow determination of the failure intensity. In Fig. 7 one
can see how the failure intensity of the subassembly used in the
simple example described previously is modiﬁed due to minor
adaptations, before any innovations take place.
3.5. Estimation of system availability performance
A performance indicator we call availability-informed capability
is derived as an output of the mathematical model. Our capability
measure aims to capture the effect of partial performance of
subassemblies on the system output, in particular the effect of
partial operation of wind turbines on the energy output from the
farm. Since the power generated by a farm is the aggregate of the
power generated by individual turbines, the availability-informed
capability is deﬁned as the fraction
CfarmðtÞ ¼
Pn
i ¼ 1 PiðtÞPn
i ¼ 1 POiðtÞ
ð18Þ
where Pi(t) is the average output power of turbine i at time t (cal-
culated by applying the power curve of a turbine to a reference wind
speed distribution at hub height), given the turbine's operating
condition, and POi(t) is the average output power of turbine i at time t
assuming it is fully operational. Therefore the average farm
availability-informed capability over some interval (τ1; τ2) is given by
Cðτ1 ;τ2Þ ¼
1
τ2τ1
Z τ2
τ1
CfarmðtÞ dt: ð19Þ
A full explanation of this performance indicator and a discussion
of why it is regarded as a meaningful measure of production
Fig. 8. High-level logic of simulation of events through time. Solid lines represent relationships between variables; dotted lines represent interventions to grow availability;
grey nodes denote triggers of systemic risk.
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farms is given in [54].
A capability estimate is computed by representing the mathe-
matical model as a point process simulation. The ﬂowchart in
Fig. 8 provides the high level logic of the simulation of events
through time and shows the types of events simulated and the
relationships between them. For example, exposure to the triggers
of systemic risk, shown by the shaded nodes, inﬂuences the failure
events of subassemblies by modulating the hazard function, as
does the condition of the subassembly (i.e. the virtual age) that
gets modulated by maintenance. History represents the combined
information about, for example, the number of past innovations
and calendar time.4. Example
We now illustrate the application of the availability growth
model for a new generation offshore wind farm. Unlike other
availability modelling approaches used in an offshore wind con-
text, our model allows for the representation of both the gradual
effect of minor adaptations, introduced through the accumulation
of operating experience, as well as the more radical effect of
innovations, such as the replacement of subassemblies withinherent weaknesses with improved versions. In our example we
compare model outputs under two scenarios: when systemic risk
due to design weaknesses is considered (i.e. growth is explicitly
modelled) and when this type of risk is omitted (i.e. as in current
availability models for offshore wind). The aim of this comparison
is to demonstrate the consequence of failing to represent systemic
risks, as well as the subsequent availability growth resulting from
restorative action, in estimating farm technical performance,
energy output and hence expected ﬁnancial return.
Our example is based on a typical large-scale Round III UK
offshore wind farm and our modelling has been developed in
collaboration with wind energy experts. Speciﬁcally, we translated
the conceptual framework shown in Fig. 1 into a process to sup-
port the customisation of the general model for the particular
context as follows: ﬁrstly, we deﬁned the system and its critical
subassemblies, for which the model was to be built and scoped the
availability growth model; secondly, we articulated the reliability
and restoration targets for the system subassemblies based upon
the achievable performance of similar relevant parts which have
accrued operational experience; thirdly, we considered the causes
and effects of failure so that we appropriately model the triggers
on the uptime performance, as well as the impact of interventions
on uptime and downtime performance.
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Our UK round III wind farm, currently at pre-construction
stage, will comprise 150 5MW turbines. The turbines have novel
design features and are larger scale than earlier versions. Eight
subassemblies (i.e. gearbox, generator, frequency converter,
transformer, main shaft bearing, blades, tower, foundations, col-
lection cable and transmission cable) have been identiﬁed as cri-
tical through discussion with subject experts, because they are
considered to be subject to high technical and physical risk. We
model each of the critical subassemblies explicitly and treat the
remaining non-critical subassemblies as one modelling group.
Availability-informed capability is to be estimated for the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of operation, which is the UK warranty period. The farm
is intended to start operation in the summer months. Engineering
experts have identiﬁed the gearbox and the frequency converter as
being at high risk because these are the subassemblies more likely
to have design weaknesses. Therefore, in the modelling we
examine scenarios associated with the prevalence of systemic risk
associated with such design weaknesses and the impact of inter-
vention strategies both on availability levels and ﬁnancially in
terms of energy production loss.
We set the target reliability for offshore turbines to equal that
achieved by mature onshore turbines since this is consistent with
engineering requirements. Analysis of relevant data shows that
onshore turbines achieve a failure rate of 3.81 failures/year. This
failure rate includes failures of any subassembly and severity, and
can be broken down to rates for speciﬁc subassemblies [22]. We
use a turbine breakdown similar to that used in onshore analyses,
which allows us to set the target reliability for each offshore
subassembly equal to the level achieved by its onshore counter-
part. Table 1 gives values for the target failure rates for the critical
subassemblies, whereas the target failure rate for the non-critical
group is the sum of the rates of the non-critical subassemblies
comprising the group [22].
Following [41,18], we categorise the effects of failure into
minor, moderate and major. Restoration durations depend on the
failure severity and are taken to be 6 h, 1 day and 2 days for a
minor, moderate and major failure respectively. The proportion of
failures of different severities for each of the critical subassemblies
is also shown in Table 1 and, again, is based on the experience
from onshore farms which is considered requisite for our offshore
context in this example.
Our farm maintenance strategy includes preventive and cor-
rective actions. The turbines will be subject to bi-annual overhauls
during which subassemblies are refurbished and for modelling
purposes we treat this as re-setting the subassembly virtual age to
50% of its value prior to the refurbishment. Condition monitoring
(CM) will be installed on the gearboxes and will provideTable 1
Subassemblies, target and apportioned failure rates. Source: data from [22,41,18].
Subassembly Target failure rate Failure apportionment
Major Moderate Minor
Gearbox 0.228 f/yr 0.09 0.27 0.64
Generator 0.266 f/yr 0.10 0.26 0.64
Frequency converter 0.456 f/yr 0.04 0.18 0.78
Transformer 0.076 f/yr 0.04 0.16 0.8
Main shaft bearing 0.038 f/yr 0.25 0.15 0.6
Blades 0.114 f/yr 0.04 0.21 0.75
Tower 0.114 f/yr 0.01 0.19 0.8
Foundations 0.038 f/yr 0.01 0.19 0.8
Non-critical group 2.47 f/yr 0.01 0.19 0.8
Collection cable 1 106 f=km=yr
Transmission cable 1 106 f=km=yrcontinuous data giving information about the state of the sub-
assembly with an average run length between signal and occur-
rence of failure of approximately 1.5 months. Finally, minor
adaptations are assumed to improve subassembly reliability in a
gradual manner. The minor adaptation parameter γ has been
chosen on the basis of providing a reasonable learning curve effect
based on historical experience from related farms.
Observation of the CM signal will allow operators to de-rate the
turbine to limit its output in order to extend its life until the next
scheduled maintenance and to reduce the chance of a hard failure.
If the fault signalled by the CM cannot be rectiﬁed remotely, then
the affected subassemblies join the list of jobs awaiting repair.
More generally, corrective repair will be conducted on a ﬁrst come,
ﬁrst served basis and will be constrained by the available main-
tenance resources and the logistical accessibility. Weather delays
are determined as described in [13] for subassembly failure types.
For example, the average waiting time for a major gearbox failure
is 9 days during the summer months and 18 days during the
winter months. The condition to which an affected subassembly
returns after maintenance depends on the severity of failure
determined previously. A minimal failure is treated with minimal
repair and the subassembly is returned to an as-bad-as-old con-
dition, while moderate and major failures result in repairs that are
believed to return the subassembly to 85% and 60% of what its
condition was just before failure respectively.
As mentioned, the major concerns about the new turbine to be
installed in our wind farm are the design weaknesses in the
gearbox and the frequency converter. These weaknesses, should
they exist, will be prevalent in all turbines in the farm, therefore
they will trigger all similar subassemblies to wear prematurely and
will therefore be a source of systemic risk. To represent systemic
weaknesses in the model, it is necessary to determine the relia-
bility of subassemblies, in terms of hazard functions, given the
presence of triggers. In our example we used a structured expert
judgement elicitation process to obtain point value estimates of
the parameters for the hazard-induced hazard functions of each
critical subassembly. Note that the expert judgement information
was obtained as part of a larger exercise reported in [55]. Table 2
shows the point values used in this application for the scenario
where systemic risk due to design weaknesses is to be explicitly
modelled.
Our example aims to highlight the importance of representing
systemic risks in farm availability performance – which is a novel
feature of our growth model. Therefore we now examine the
scenario where upgrades intended to address design weaknesses
of the gearbox and frequency converter designs are rolled out
across the turbines in the farm in Year 2 (i.e. a trigger exists) and
compare it to a baseline scenario where there are no systemic
weaknesses (i.e. the trigger does not exist).Table 2
Point estimates of parameters based on expert judgement to reﬂect the effect of
premature wearout due to design inadequacy of gearbox and frequency converter.
The CM indicator relates to gearbox degradation. Unit of time is a year.
Gearbox Frequency converter
Shocks λ¼ 0:019 –
(Exponential)
Wear-out onset μ¼ 0:335 μ¼ 0:992
(Normal) σ ¼ 0:01 σ ¼ 0:01
Signal η¼ 15 –
(Weibull) β¼ 1:5 –
Full operation η¼ 5:15 η¼ 2:2
(Weibull) β¼ 1:19 β¼ 1:2
Partial operation η¼ 5 –
(Weibull) β¼ 1:5 –
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Scenario 2: with systemic risk
Fig. 9. Estimated early life availability-informed capability for simulated scenarios: (a) no recognised gearbox and frequency converter design weaknesses; (b) design
inadequacy weaknesses result in deteriorating farm performance over the next two years; performance reaches target levels once issues are removed through imple-
mentation of innovations.
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Our modelling provides performance proﬁles for the farm over
the ﬁrst ﬁve years of operation, starting in summer of Year 0, for
both scenarios. The model has been developed as a modular
simulation in Matlab, making it feasible to replace or to extend
modelling features. Monte Carlo simulations based on the com-
putational model logic shown in Fig. 8 are used to calculate the
aleatory uncertainty on the availability-informed capability on a
two-weekly basis using N¼100 runs. This is a limited number of
simulation runs but the choice was made as a practical trade-off
between simulation runtime and estimation accuracy. Further,
since our primary goal here is to examine patterns in availability
performance proﬁles, we have shown only the 50% quantiles in the
model output plots.
Fig. 9 illustrates the 50% quantiles of bi-weekly availability-
informed capability proﬁles under the two scenarios. When sys-
temic design weaknesses are not considered explicitly in the ana-
lysis, Fig. 9(a) shows that performance is below the typical target of
97% capability for the ﬁrst quarter of Year 1, before gradually
improving due to the effects of minor adaptations to achieve an
availability of around 99%. However, as Fig. 9(b) shows, the systemic
effects of design inadequacies can reduce early farm performance to
a level below 90% capability. Our results show that the predicted
farm performance deteriorates prematurely during the ﬁrst two
years of operation until innovations in the form of the design
upgrades are undertaken during the summer months of Year 2.
Following the successful mitigation of systemic risk, performance
increases gradually. Fig. 10 shows the equivalent estimated failure
intensity rate for the farm for our two scenarios. The common
learning effects due to minor adaptations of, for example, proce-
dures lead to pattern of reduction in the failure intensity under
Scenario 1. The impact of systemic risk due to the designweaknesses appears as an increasing failure intensity over the ﬁrst
two years of operation before decreasing substantially over the last
half of Year 3 when the full effects of the design modiﬁcation
combined with the minor adaptations are achieved across the farm.
By applying the wind speed distribution on the power curve of
a turbine, the total farm energy production and associated revenue
can be estimated. Table 3 provides the results under our two
scenarios. If the energy price is d155 per MWh, and without
modelling triggers of systemic risk, then the expected revenue
over the ﬁrst 5 years of operation is computed to be 1760 million
pounds. However when systemic risk is properly accounted for in
the analysis, the farm generates a revenue of 1722 million pounds
over the same period. This implies that failing to model growth in
availability, but instead assuming that steady-state performance
can be achieved from the outset, can lead to an overestimation of
farm revenue in the range of 38 million pounds even before taking
into account the cost of innovations. In this example these costs
would be those accrued in the re-design and re-ﬁtting of 150
problematic frequency converters and gearboxes.
The example shows clearly what kind of impact systemic risks
can have on wind farm ﬁnancial performance. Current modelling
of offshore wind farm availability does not take account of growth
due to the risks associated with innovation, leading to over-
optimistic planning and high costs of mitigation. Simply having
awareness of this type of problem during planning and contracting
can focus minds on maintaining options to deal with the nature of
this issue.5. Conclusions and further work
We have presented an availability growth model for a system,
such as an offshore wind farm, where innovations might be made
Table 3
Expected farm output over early life assuming average wind speed under two
scenarios and an energy price of d155 per MWh.
Scenario Early life output
Energy (GWh) Revenue (million d)
No triggers 11,355 1760
Triggers 11,109 1722
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Fig. 10. Estimated early life failure intensity rate denoted by ROCOF for simulated scenario: (a) no recognised gearbox and frequency converter design weaknesses; (b) design
inadequacy weaknesses result in increasing rate over the next two years before reducing after effect of innovation.
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availability are required prior to entry into service. Importantly,
this includes exploration of mitigation strategies for the initial
period of operation, should availability problems emerge, and
should inﬂuence logistics planning and options on service provi-
sion. While our availability growth model has been motivated by,
and its application illustrated for, the offshore wind problem, the
generic structure of the model means that it can be adapted to
other domains where commercially unproven technology or pro-
cesses are used. The model presented is designed to provide
insight into the effectiveness of interventions on growth in system
performance by providing availability estimates under different
scenarios. Our example for a typical UK Round III wind farm
highlights the importance of being able to meaningfully assess
farm performance over early life when systemic risks due to
design, maintenance and operational weaknesses may still exist.
The model provides a means of measuring the impact of systemic
risk on availability performance and can be used to quantify the
ﬁnancial implications of underestimating performance relative to
target.
The model, as presented here, considers only aleatory uncer-
tainties and allows the exploration of different scenarios with
decision makers. This is useful for dealing with managers inindustry as it allows them to explore the implications of issues
that they are aware of, but are not currently modelling. A more
sophisticated mathematical approach which uses epistemic
uncertainties to create a more formal rational decision-making
model framework is developed in a further paper [54]. However,
this further approach inevitably requires that decision makers
‘buy-in’ to the expert uncertainty assessments which have to be
gathered from a variety of different stakeholders. Since the avail-
ability growth scenario approach presented here already enables
decision makers to explore key problems without having to
commit to a more conceptually sophisticated and complex
approach, it is genuinely useful both to deal with those problems
where the more complex approach would probably not make a
difference, and also to motivate them to go on to the more com-
plex approach when it is needed. Our point of view in this regard
is consistent with that expressed by I.J. Good [21] who said that a
rational decision maker should take account of the cost of the
decision analysis (to all parties) as well as the direct costs and
beneﬁts of the decision.
Our current model code is based on the set of assumptions
described. While reasonable for our example domain, they might
need to be developed for other application areas. Further, the
implementation of sensitivity or uncertainty analysis would
require further consideration of the simulation model computa-
tion so that appropriate numbers of simulation runs can be efﬁ-
ciently generated to provide suitably accurate results. For example,
future work could involve the use of metamodels such as emula-
tors [36,28] to approximate the simulation model and to speed up
computation.
Our example provides insight into how the general growth
model can be customised for a particular system by articulating
the modelling choices. For example, the classiﬁcation of sub-
assemblies to critical and non-critical, as well as the speciﬁc trig-
gers considered, was achieved using the structured judgement of
A. Zitrou et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 152 (2016) 83–9494wind energy experts, and can be modiﬁed to reﬂect the systemic
risks relevant to a particular situation. Similarly, the condition
monitoring characteristics, which we represented by the timing of
the signal relevant to failure and the operational response, can be
modiﬁed to represent actual maintenance of a given system. To
build a meaningful model for decision makers requires engage-
ment with relevant engineering experts to both qualitatively
structure the model and to quantify selected parameters. We have
developed a scientiﬁc protocol to support collection and pre-
paration of data details of which are provided in [55]. Ongoing
work includes further engagement with stakeholders experienced
in offshore wind farm engineering, technology and operations to
conduct validation studies of the availability growth model and
supporting data management processes.Acknowledgements
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